The judge determined that even if modification would otherwise be warranted, he nevertheless denied contribution, Since the children were five and two years old at the time of the agreement, the failure of the parents to address the issue of college expenses could, the judge stated, "fairly be attributed to the young age of the children, as opposed to a mutual decision not to obligate themselves." Accordingly, he concluded, correctly, that the agreement was not fully integrated and that, absent other considerations, modification would be warranted on a showing of a material change in circumstances. 490 (1994), cases involving separation agreements which were silent, as is the one at bar, on 756 (2002), rather than those of McCarthy v. In a well-reasoned opinion, the judge first determined that the circumstances were closer to those set forth in Cabot v. The mother appeals from a decision of a judge of the Probate Court denying her request. After their daughter graduated from Tufts University, the plaintiff (mother) sought modification of a divorce judgment so as to require, inter alia, contribution from her former husband (father) for college expenses of approximately $66,000 which she had paid. Lordan, Jr., for the plaintiff.Ĭhristopher J. Parties' agreement was silent on the issue of collegeĮducation and modification was not sought while the childĬOMPLAINT for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on May 28, 1982.Ī complaint for modification, filed on February 15, 2002, was heard by John C. Modify a divorce judgment to require contribution from herįormer husband for their child's college expenses, where the Present: ARMSTRONG, C.J., DREBEN, & KANTROWITZ, JJ.ĭivorce and Separation, Modification of judgment, Child support.Ī Probate Court judge properly denied a plaintiff's request to
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